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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
  
RESTANI, Judge 
 
Eli and Renee Chabot (“the Chabots”) appeal the 
District Court’s grant of the Internal Revenue Service’s 
(“IRS”) petition to enforce summonses for foreign bank 
account records that 31 C.F.R. § 1010.420 requires the 
Chabots to keep.  Today we join six other circuits in holding 
that these records fall within the required records exception to 
the Fifth Amendment privilege.  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the District Court’s grant of the IRS’s petition. 
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I. Background 
 
In April 2010, the IRS received information from 
French authorities concerning United States persons1 with 
undisclosed bank accounts at HSBC Bank.  The IRS alleges 
that it has information regarding accounts held by Pelsa 
Business Inc. (“Pelsa”) for the years 2005 through 2007.  
According to the information provided to the IRS, Eli Chabot 
is the beneficial owner of Pelsa. 
 
 On June 20, 2012, the IRS issued summonses to Eli 
and Renee Chabot requesting that they appear on July 13, 
2012, to give testimony and produce documents about their 
foreign bank accounts for the period from January 1, 2006, to 
December 31, 2009.2  The Chabots’ attorney notified the IRS 
that the Chabots would not appear, were asserting their Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and would 
not produce the requested documents.  The IRS amended the 
two summonses on November 16, 2012, limiting their scope 
to only those documents required to be maintained under 31 
C.F.R. § 1010.420.  The Chabots continued to claim the Fifth 
Amendment privilege, and the IRS filed a petition to enforce 
the amended summonses on May 14, 2014. 
 
                                              
1 “United States person” is defined in 31 C.F.R. 
§ 1010.350(b).  The parties do not dispute that the Chabots or 
their business are United States persons. 
 
2 The IRS had issued an earlier summons on March 12, 2012, 
requesting that the Chabots appear to testify.  The Chabots 
appeared on May 12, 2012, but asserted their Fifth 
Amendment privilege and refused to answer any of the IRS’s 
questions about their foreign bank accounts. 
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 Before the District Court, the Chabots claimed that, 
although the contents of the records sought might not be 
protected by the Fifth Amendment, their act of producing the 
documents was protected.  The Chabots specifically claimed 
that responding to the summonses might subject them to 
prosecution for their failure to file the same information in an 
annual Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts.  The 
Chabots also claimed that any exception to the Fifth 
Amendment privilege based on the required records exception 
should not apply in this case.  The District Court held that the 
required records exception applied and thus the Fifth 
Amendment did not prohibit production of the documents 
sought.  The District Court therefore granted the petition to 
enforce the summonses. 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 26 
U.S.C. § 7402(b) and 26 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2012).  We 
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Whether 
enforcement of a summons violates the Fifth Amendment 
privilege is a mixed question of law and fact.  United States v. 
Ins. Consultants of Knox, Inc., 187 F.3d 755, 759 (7th Cir. 
1999).  Here, the question before us is purely one of law, and 
we review de novo the District Court’s application of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege and the required records 
exception to the present facts.  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 
707 F.3d 1262, 1266 n.4 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
On appeal, the Chabots’ arguments can be summarized 
as follows: (1) allowing the government to rely on the 
required records exception to enforce the summonses in this 
case will lead to general governmental abrogation of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege for any “failure to report” crime; 
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(2) the information that would be gleaned from compliance 
with the summonses is almost identical to what the 
government needs to charge the Chabots with the felony of 
willful failure to report an overseas account in the Report of 
Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, thus requiring the 
Chabots to incriminate themselves; and (3) the records that 31 
C.F.R. § 1010.420 requires accountholders to keep do not 
satisfy the three-pronged test for applying the required 
records exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege.  The 
government’s response to these arguments is simple.  It 
argues that the Chabots’ records fall within the required 
records exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege.  
Therefore, the questions before the panel are whether the 
Chabots’ account records fall within the required records 
exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege and, if so, 
whether the Chabots’ policy concerns are insurmountable 
barriers to our application of this exception.  Unpersuaded by 
the overriding effect of the stated concerns, we conclude that 
the Chabots’ account records fall squarely within the required 
records exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege.  
Therefore, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of the 
IRS’s petition. 
 
A. The Development of the Required Records 
Exception to the Fifth Amendment Privilege 
 
The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o person . . . shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.”  U.S. Const. amend. V.  An individual may claim 
this privilege if compelled to produce self-incriminating, 
“testimonial communication[s].”  Fisher v. United States, 425 
U.S. 391, 408 (1976).  The act of producing documents may 
trigger the Fifth Amendment privilege.  See id. at 410.  This 
is because, by producing documents, one acknowledges that 
the documents exist, admits that the documents are in one’s 
custody, and concedes that the documents are those that the 
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subpoena requests.  Id.  When these “testimonial” aspects of 
compelled production are self-incriminating, the Fifth 
Amendment privilege applies.  See id. at 410–12. 
 
In Shapiro v. United States, the Supreme Court first 
articulated the required records exception to the Fifth 
Amendment privilege.  335 U.S. 1, 32–33 (1948); In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena Dated Feb. 2, 2012, 741 F.3d 339, 344 (2d 
Cir. 2013) (hereinafter “Doe”).  When Shapiro was decided, 
private papers were entitled to Fifth Amendment protection 
based on their private status.  See 335 U.S. at 33–34.  Public 
papers, however, did not have Fifth Amendment protection.  
See id. at 5.  In Shapiro, the Supreme Court qualified this 
distinction when it held that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
did not apply to certain private papers that the law required a 
person to keep.  Id. at 33.  The Supreme Court subsequently 
fleshed out Shapiro’s holding in Grosso v. United States, 
wherein it explained that the following three prongs must be 
met in order for records to fall within the “required records” 
exception: (1) the reporting or recordkeeping scheme must 
have an essentially regulatory purpose; (2) a person must 
customarily keep the records that the scheme requires him to 
keep; and (3) the records must have “public aspects.”  390 
U.S. 62, 67–68 (1968). 
 
Fisher, which found no Fifth Amendment privilege 
because the involved taxpayers were not the persons 
compelled to produce, appeared to shift the focus away from 
the private/public distinction in determining whether 
compelled production of records violates the Fifth 
Amendment privilege.3  See 425 U.S. at 397, 400–01.  
                                              
3 The degree to which Fisher represents a complete 
repudiation of the private/public distinction remains unsettled.  
It has been stated that the general consensus is that Fisher was 
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Despite this somewhat altered view of how the Fifth 
Amendment relates to the production of documents, courts 
have continued to rely on the required records exception.  
See, e.g., Balt. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 
U.S. 549, 555–56 (1990) (recognizing the principle behind 
the required records exception abrogated respondent’s act-of-
production privilege even though her compliance with a court 
order to produce her child would have aided in her 
prosecution); Doe, 741 F.3d at 342–43, 346 (applying the 
required records exception to the respondent’s act-of-
production privilege where his compliance with a grand 
jury’s subpoena for account records would have aided in 
criminal proceedings against him). 
 
Courts have offered several reasons for continuing to 
apply the required records exception to the Fifth Amendment 
privilege, even though the threshold framework for applying 
the privilege to documents appears to have changed to a 
degree.  The first is, engaging in an activity for which 
Congress conditions participation upon recordkeeping 
effectively waives the right to invoke the Fifth Amendment 
privilege to prevent compelled disclosure of such records.  In 
re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum Dated Aug. 21, 
1985, 793 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1986).  The next, and perhaps 
weaker, is, because “the records must be kept by law, the 
record-holder ‘admits’ little in the way of control or 
authentication by producing them.”  Id.  And the last is, 
continued application of the required records exception is 
vital in order to protect the government’s legitimate interest in 
using the records that it requires individuals to keep.  See, 
e.g., Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 556 (“The Court has on several 
                                                                                                     
an attempt to find Fifth Amendment protections applicable to 
compelled production of documents without relying on the 
private/public distinction.  Doe, 741 F.3d at 343 n.2. 
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occasions recognized that the Fifth Amendment privilege may 
not be invoked to resist compliance with a regulatory regime 
constructed to effect the State’s public purposes unrelated to 
the enforcement of its criminal laws.”); In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 707 F.3d at 1274 (citing In re Special Feb. 2011-
1 Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Sept. 12, 2011, 691 F.3d 903, 
908–09 (7th Cir. 2012)).  These reasons support application 
of the exception under either the private/public framework or 
the act-of-production framework.  Thus, the required records 
exception has retained its vitality as an exception to the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  See 
Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 554–62. 
 
B. The Government’s Ability to Use the 
Required Records Exception to Abrogate the 
Fifth Amendment Privilege 
 
The Chabots predict that inclusion of their account 
records in the required records exception will encourage the 
government to make excessive use of the exception in order 
to abrogate the Fifth Amendment privilege for any “failure to 
report” crime.  The Chabots also suggest that this would 
allow the government to abrogate the Fifth Amendment more 
generally by creating a host of record-retention or reporting 
requirements.  Because there is significant overlap between 
this argument and the first prong of the required records 
exception, we address only briefly the Chabots’ argument 
here. 
 
 In Shapiro, the Supreme Court explained that there 
was little danger of Congress completely abrogating the Fifth 
Amendment privilege as long as the records that Congress 
required individuals to keep closely served the purpose of a 
valid, civil regulation.  Shapiro, 335 U.S. at 32–33.  In that 
case, the Emergency Price Control Act was a valid exercise of 
Congress’s power to set commodity prices during wartime 
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that required vendors to keep records of their sales.  Id. at 5 
n.3, 32–33.  Because these sale records closely served the 
Act’s legitimate regulatory purpose, the Court concluded that 
inclusion of the petitioner’s sales records in the required 
records exception was a far cry from Congress’s total 
abrogation of the Fifth Amendment privilege for any and all 
crimes.  See id. at 4–5, 32–33.  In short, because of the 
required records exception’s exclusive application to valid, 
regulatory recordkeeping schemes, the government cannot 
simply create a recordkeeping requirement in order to 
prosecute crimes, such as a willful failure to report offense.  
See In re Grand Jury Investigation M.H., 648 F.3d 1067, 
1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2011) (hereinafter “M.H.”). 
 
In the present case, the government conditions 
voluntary participation in foreign banking on maintaining 
records and reporting information regarding foreign bank 
accounts.  See id. at 1078.  As explained in greater detail 
regarding the first prong of the Grosso test, the recordkeeping 
requirement is part of a valid, essentially regulatory scheme.  
These records serve legitimate noncriminal purposes, because 
government agencies use this data for tax collection, 
development of monetary policy, and conducting intelligence 
activities.  See United States v. Under Seal, 737 F.3d 330, 
335, 337 (4th Cir. 2013) (listing the noncriminal purposes for 
which government agencies, including the Treasury 
Department, use account record data); In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 696 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 2012) (employing 
similar reasoning).  Therefore, it is unlikely that the 
government will be able to use the required records exception 
to abrogate the Fifth Amendment privilege for any and all 
“failure to report” crimes. 
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C. Compliance with the Summonses Will Result 
in Criminal Liability 
 
The Chabots contend that compliance with the IRS’s 
summonses for their account records will provide a 
“significant link in the chain of evidence” that the 
government needs to prosecute them for willful failure to 
report overseas account(s) to the IRS.  Appellant’s Br. 12.  
Unfortunately for the Chabots, this argument echoes the 
familiar yet unsuccessful arguments of other holders of 
foreign bank accounts who have invoked the Fifth 
Amendment privilege to prevent compliance with summonses 
for required records.  See, e.g., Doe, 741 F.3d at 342–43, 353 
(rejecting same argument). 
 
Courts use prong one of the required records exception 
to evaluate whether compliance with a recordkeeping scheme 
is likely to lead to criminal charges as a general matter.  Doe, 
741 F.3d at 349; M.H., 648 F.3d at 1074–75.  If the scheme’s 
main purpose is to force individuals to turn over potentially 
incriminating evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions, 
the scheme is not essentially regulatory.  See M.H., 648 F.3d 
at 1075 (concluding that § 1010.420 is essentially regulatory, 
in part, because the records that it requires accountholders to 
keep are not inherently incriminating and therefore not 
significant links in the chain of evidence necessary to bring 
criminal charges against accountholders).  As discussed in 
further detail infra, production of the records that the IRS 
seeks is unlikely to lead to criminal proceedings as a general 
matter, because owning a bank account overseas is not an 
inherently criminal activity.  Id. at 1074. 
 
To the extent that the Chabots argue that production of 
the requested account records will establish a significant link 
in the chain of evidence in their particular case, we are not 
persuaded that this precludes application of the required 
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records exception.  The Fifth Amendment applies only if the 
compelled production is potentially self-incriminating.  If 
producing the documents were not potentially incriminating, 
the Chabots would have no Fifth Amendment concerns.  It is 
the potentially incriminating nature of production that allows 
the Chabots to invoke an otherwise valid Fifth Amendment 
privilege.  It is this same potentially incriminating nature that 
makes the required records exception relevant to the Chabots’ 
account records.  See Doe, 741 F.3d at 344.  The Chabots’ 
argument appears to boil down to this: the exception to the 
Fifth Amendment is inapplicable if the Fifth Amendment 
otherwise would apply.  Such an argument is nothing more 
than a request that the exception be abolished altogether—a 
request we must reject. 
 
D. Applying the Required Records Exception to 
Section 1010.420 
 
As indicated, in Grosso, the Supreme Court set forth 
the following three-part test for when the required records 
exception should be applied to the Fifth Amendment 
privilege: 
 
[F]irst, the purposes of the United States’ 
inquiry must be essentially regulatory; second, 
information is to be obtained by requiring the 
preservation of records of a kind which the 
regulated party has customarily kept; and third, 
the records themselves must have assumed 
‘public aspects’ which render them at least 
analogous to public documents. 
 
390 U.S. at 67–68.  Although this is an issue of first 
impression for this Circuit, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, 
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits previously have 
applied the required records exception to enforce summonses 
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for the records that 31 C.F.R. § 1010.420 requires 
accountholders to keep.4  Today we join these circuits in 
applying the required records exception to this “subset of . . . 
documents that must be maintained by law.”  Doe, 741 F.3d 
at 344. 
 
1. Essentially Regulatory Purpose 
 
 The Chabots contend that § 1010.420 is a 
recordkeeping scheme with an essentially criminal purpose.  
The first prong of the required records exception asks whether 
a recordkeeping scheme targets an inherently criminal activity 
and/or an inherently suspicious class of persons.  See Doe, 
741 F.3d at 347–48; M.H., 648 F.3d at 1075–76.  Therefore, 
we begin our inquiry by determining what and whom 
§ 1010.420 targets.  Section 1010.420 regulates foreign bank 
account ownership, an activity in which people participate for 
a myriad of legitimate and legal reasons.  As the Chabots’ 
counsel recognized at oral argument, someone might own an 
overseas account to ensure convenient access to money when 
living, working, or even vacationing abroad.  Oral Argument 
at 13:19, 13:48, United States v. Chabot, (No. 14-4465), 
available at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/ 
audio/14-4465USAv.Chabot,etal.mp3. 
 
                                              
4 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Feb. 2, 2012, 741 
F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Under Seal, 737 
F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 2013); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 707 
F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2013); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 696 
F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Special Feb. 2011-1 Grand 
Jury Subpoena Dated Sept. 12, 2011, 691 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 
2012); In re Grand Jury Investigation M.H., 648 F.3d 1067 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
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In a similar vein, the class of persons who own foreign 
bank accounts is comprised of law-abiding citizens as well as 
miscreants.  Doe, 741 F.3d at 350–51.  On this point, we 
agree with the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that “the [Bank 
Secrecy Act]’s record-keeping requirements do not apply 
exclusively to those engaged in criminal activity.”  In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena, 696 F.3d at 435.  
  
Where a recordkeeping scheme exclusively targets 
those who engage in illegal activities, its purpose is 
essentially criminal.  For example, the Supreme Court held 
that the statutes at issue in Grosso and Marchetti v. United 
States were essentially criminal because the regulations at 
issue exclusively targeted individuals who were engaged in 
an inherently illegal activity, namely gambling.  Grosso, 390 
U.S. at 68; Marchetti, 390 U.S. 39, 46–48 (1968).  See also 
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 18 (1969) (holding that 
petitioner’s Fifth Amendment privilege was violated when 
“compliance with the transfer tax provisions [of the 
Marihuana Tax Act] would have required petitioner 
unmistakably to identify himself as a member of this 
‘selective’ and ‘suspect’ group [of individuals who failed to 
comply with the Act’s order form requirement]”); Haynes v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 85, 96, 100 (1968) (concluding that 
the registration requirement of the National Firearms Act 
violated petitioner’s Fifth Amendment privilege where the 
requirement mainly targeted individuals who possessed a 
firearm but had failed to comply with the Act’s other 
requirements, therefore targeting an inherently suspicious 
class of persons).  Conversely, because § 1010.420 does not 
apply exclusively, or even largely, to criminals, it does not 
operate simply as a dragnet for criminals by forcing them to 
maintain self-incriminating records.  Instead, § 1010.420 is an 
essentially regulatory scheme.  See also In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 707 F.3d at 1272 (concluding that § 1010.420 
has an essentially regulatory purpose because it targets 
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neither “inherently illegal activity” nor an “inherently 
suspect” group of individuals). 
 
 The Chabots contend that the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network’s administration of § 1010.420 
evidences the regulation’s essentially criminal purpose.  The 
Chabots attempt to bolster their argument by highlighting the 
fact that the records that § 1010.420 requires accountholders 
to keep are also useful for potential criminal proceedings 
against these individuals.  As the government asserted at oral 
argument, “bank records can be very important for . . . a lot of 
things [that] you might want to investigate about a person.”  
Oral Argument at 27:29.  Just because some of these things 
have criminal aspects does not mean that § 1010.420’s 
purpose is essentially criminal.  See, e.g., Under Seal, 737 
F.3d at 334–36 (explaining that, despite how useful records 
maintained under § 1010.420 are to criminal prosecutions, 
this utility does not negate § 1010.420’s other noncriminal 
purposes). 
 
 As the government acknowledged at oral argument, 
one of Congress’s goals in passing the Bank Secrecy Act of 
1970 was to reach accountholders who were avoiding U.S. 
criminal laws.  Oral Argument at 27:19.  Section 1010.420 
was promulgated pursuant to this Act and therefore shares 
this goal.  An equally important objective of both the Act and 
§ 1010.420, however, is to monitor and facilitate compliance 
with currency regulation and tax laws.  Id. at 27:20; see also 
Under Seal, 737 F.3d at 335 (noting that the Bank Secrecy 
Act was enacted for “concomitant tax, regulatory, and 
counterterrorism purposes in addition to its [the Act’s] law 
enforcement goals”).  Accordingly, like our sister circuits that 
have addressed these arguments, we find the Chabots’ 
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arguments that § 1010.420 is an essentially criminal scheme 
to be unpersuasive.5 
 
2. Customarily Kept  
 
The Chabots argue that holders of overseas accounts 
customarily would not keep the records that § 1010.420 
requires them to maintain.  Though the courts have not settled 
on a formal definition of “customarily kept,” we find 
instructive the guideline from the Second Circuit that asks 
whether holders of foreign bank accounts as a general group 
are likely to keep the records that § 1010.420 requires them to 
keep, rather than only examining the practices of those 
individuals who engage in foreign banking solely to avoid 
U.S. laws.  Doe, 741 F.3d at 350–51.  As stated succinctly by 
the Ninth Circuit: “[R]ecords appear to be customarily kept if 
they would typically be kept in connection with the regulated 
activity.”  M.H., 648 F.3d at 1076.  Therefore, we begin our 
inquiry by examining what records those who lawfully 
engage in foreign banking ordinarily would retain.  
 
Section 1010.420 mandates that owners and 
beneficiaries of foreign accounts keep the following 
information accessible for five years: (1) the name on the 
account, (2) the account number, (3) the name and address of 
the bank or person with whom the account is maintained, 
(4) the account type, and (5) the maximum annual account 
value.  31 C.F.R. § 1010.420.  Common sense tells us that 
this is all information that an accountholder needs in order to 
access funds located abroad or at home.  See M.H., 648 F.3d 
at 1076 (concluding that the records that § 1010.420 requires 
individuals to keep contain essential information for 
accountholders and beneficiaries).  Because reasonable 
                                              
5 See supra note 4. 
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accountholders would retain this information in order to 
readily access their foreign accounts, we conclude that these 
are records that accountholders customarily would keep.6  
Doe, 741 F.3d at 350; In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 696 F.3d at 
435. 
 
The Chabots’ additional contention that no 
accountholder keeps records of the maximum annual values 
of his overseas accounts is unpersuasive.  Maximum annual 
account values are simply account balances, and account 
owners typically keep these numbers on record.  See Doe, 
741 F.3d at 350; M.H., 648 F.3d at 1076. 
 
The Chabots further argue that even if there are some 
accountholders who maintain the records that § 1010.420 
requires them to keep, they do not retain these records for the 
five-year period that § 1010.420 mandates.  The Chabots, 
however, misunderstand the inquiry that this prong of the 
required records exception entails.  The “customarily kept” 
analysis simply asks whether individuals typically would 
maintain the information that the law requires them to keep, 
not the length of time for which they normally would do so 
                                              
6 Though some courts have found the similarity between the 
type of information contained in the records that § 1010.420 
requires accountholders to keep and the information that these 
individuals must report to the IRS pursuant to § 1010.350 to 
be additional proof that accountholders customarily keep this 
information, we find this reasoning to be circular.  See, e.g., 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 707 F.3d at 1273; In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena, 696 F.3d at 435; M.H., 648 F.3d at 1076.  On 
this point, the Chabots aptly note: “The government and the 
courts seem to say, well, if the government has a regulation 
that requires this information . . . it’s regularly kept because 
we require you to keep it.”  Oral Argument at 28:59. 
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absent the requirement.  The Chabots fail to cite any case in 
which the length of time for which someone usually kept a 
document affected the court’s holding on whether or not the 
document was customarily kept, and we have been unable to 
identify any such case.  See, e.g., M.H., 648 F.3d at 1076 
(explaining that “records appear to be customarily kept if they 
would typically be kept in connection with the regulated 
activity”).  Furthermore, here, we do not deal with an 
extraordinarily long time period, but rather one that seems 
appropriate for taxation and similar purposes. 
 
We therefore conclude that prong two is met.  
 
3.  Public Aspects  
 
The Chabots contend that their account records do not 
have public aspects because owning a foreign bank account is 
not a public activity.  It is undeniable that an individual who 
holds an overseas account normally does not think of his 
account records as being equivalent to public records.  
Nevertheless, “[t]he fact that documents have privacy 
protections elsewhere does not transform those documents 
into private documents” for all purposes.  M.H., 648 F.3d at 
1078.  We note that several circuits have reasoned that 
records required to be kept under a valid, civil regulatory 
scheme (i.e., meet prong one of the Grosso test) automatically 
have “public aspects” sufficient to meet the third prong.  See, 
e.g., Doe, 741 F.3d at 352; M.H., 648 F.3d at 1076–77.  We 
need not adopt such a broad holding to conclude that the 
documents requested here have sufficient “public aspects” to 
meet the third prong of the Grosso test.  
 
As discussed earlier under the first prong of the Grosso 
test, § 1010.420 is a valid, civil regulatory scheme, and the 
Chabots voluntarily participated in the regulated activity, 
namely foreign banking.  When accountholders such as the 
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Chabots voluntarily engage in foreign banking, they 
effectively waive their Fifth Amendment privilege to prevent 
the government’s compelled disclosure of their account 
records.7  See M.H., 648 F.3d at 1078 (relying on this consent 
theory in concluding that the appellant’s account records 
satisfied the public aspects prong of the Grosso test); In re 
Special Feb. 2011-1 Grand Jury Subpoena, 691 F.3d at 909 
(“The voluntary choice to engage in an activity that imposes 
record-keeping requirements under a valid civil regulatory 
scheme carries consequences, perhaps the most significant of 
which . . . is the possibility that those records might have to 
be turned over upon demand, notwithstanding any Fifth 
Amendment privilege.”); cf. Smith v. Richert, 35 F.3d 300, 
                                              
7 Following oral argument, the Chabots submitted a letter 
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j), citing the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Horne v. Department of Agriculture, No. 
14-275 (June 22, 2015).  The Chabots cite Horne for the 
proposition that “while the government may regulate an 
activity, it may not structure its regulation in a way that 
abrogates a Constitutional protection, and then point to 
engagement in such activity as voluntary waiver.”  
Appellants’ Rule 28(j) Letter 2 (July 14, 2015).  The 
proposition put forward by the Chabots and the language 
cited for it, which is taken out of context, is far too broad.  
The Supreme Court clearly indicated that the specific issue 
addressed related to takings, not the privilege against self-
incrimination (or any other constitutional right for that 
matter), and that the conclusion it was reaching was specific 
to the facts presented in that case.  See Horne, Slip Op. at 12 
(“The third question presented asks ‘Whether a governmental 
mandate to relinquish specific, identifiable property as a 
“condition” on permission to engage in commerce effects a 
per se taking.’  The answer, at least in this case, is yes.”). 
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303 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that production of certain 
documents necessary to determine personal income tax 
liability were not within required records exception, because 
“[t]he decision to become a taxpayer cannot be thought 
voluntary . . . [as] [a]lmost anyone who works is a taxpayer, 
along with many who do not”).  The government circulates 
the data from these records to several government agencies, 
which use this information for a number of important non-
criminal purposes.  See Under Seal, 737 F.3d at 335, 337 
(concluding that the records kept pursuant to § 1010.420 
possess public aspects given the Treasury Department’s 
circulation of this data to other government agencies for the 
purpose of implementing economic, monetary, and regulatory 
public policies); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 696 F.3d at 436 
(employing similar reasoning). Through these processes, the 
Chabots’ account records acquire public aspects. 
 
The Chabots contend that the absence of a licensing 
requirement for foreign banking necessarily means that their 
account records do not have public aspects.  This argument, 
however, does nothing to advance the Chabots’ case, because 
private activities that do not require licenses still may be 
subject to the required records exception.  See Under Seal, 
737 F.3d at 337 (refusing to accept appellant’s argument that 
his foreign bank account records were not subject to the 
required records exception because banking is a private 
activity which does not require participants to obtain 
licenses); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 707 F.3d at 1274 n.8 
(same); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 696 F.3d at 435–36 
(same).  We conclude that the records sought in this case are 
sufficiently imbued with “public aspects” to satisfy the third 
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prong of the required records exception.8  Thus all three 
prongs are met. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The Chabots have failed to raise valid policy or other 
reasons as to why their account records should not be 
included in the required records exception to the Fifth 
Amendment privilege.  Because § 1010.420 is essentially 
regulatory, requires account owners to retain records that they 
customarily keep, and requires retention of records that have 
public aspects, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of the 
IRS’s petition. 
                                              
8 As the interstate commerce power gives Congress the 
authority to prohibit foreign banking, Congress could impose 
the lesser restriction of a licensing requirement on foreign 
banking.  See Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 46–
47 (1974) (noting that “[t]he plenary authority of Congress 
over both interstate and foreign commerce is not open to 
dispute, and that body was not limited to any one particular 
approach to effectuate its concern”); Doe, 741 F.3d at 351–
52.  Obviously, this kind of scheme would be considerably 
more burdensome than § 1010.420’s current recordkeeping 
requirements. 
